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SOVEREIGNTY AND DELEGATION IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
DAVID EPSTEIN*
SHARYN O’HALLORAN**
I
INTRODUCTION
Established in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations
established to “contribute to peace and security by promoting international
collaboration through education, science, and culture.”1 After a peaceful
beginning, UNESCO became embroiled in controversy with the 1980
publication of the MacBride Report, which called for the democratization of
communication and strengthening of national media.2 The United States and
the United Kingdom denounced the report as an attack on freedom of the press
and criticized the organization in general as a platform for communist and
Third World countries to attack the West.3
The United States withdrew its funding for and membership in UNESCO in
1984, followed by the United Kingdom the next year.4 In the ensuing decade,
UNESCO toned down its rhetoric and reorganized itself to be less top-heavy.
The United Kingdom eventually rejoined UNESCO in 1997,5 and the United
States rejoined in 2003.6 How can we explain the exit and reentry of these two
crucial countries? Why were they willing to be associated with UNESCO for
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1. Global Embassy, Goodwill Ambassadors UNESCO, http://www.globalembassy.org/
goodwillambass_UNESCO.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
2. See Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists: Problem, Practice, and Prospects,
11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 339, 349 (1994).
3. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
International Organization: United States’ Return to UNESCO, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 977, 977–78 (2003).
4. Anna Gercas, The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Promoting
International Discussion on the Morality of Non-Therapeutic Research on Children, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L.
629, 632 n.11 (2006).
5. The White House, Fact Sheet: United States Rejoins UNESCO, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/09/20020912-4.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
6. U.S. Dep’t of State, United States of America and UNESCO: Building Knowledge, Bridging
Culture, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/unesco/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
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one period of time but not another, and how did their behavior affect the
organization’s policies?
The UNESCO case highlights a key feature of delegation relationships
within international organizations (IOs)—namely, that membership in such
organizations is voluntary. What sets IOs apart from countries’ internal
delegation regimes is the fact that if a country is not satisfied with the results it
is obtaining via membership in the organization, it can simply exit, as the
United States and the United Kingdom did from UNESCO, or simply decline
to join the organization in the first place.7 This stands in contrast to, for
instance, interbranch delegation; if Congress is unhappy with the executive’s
use of delegated authority, it cannot simply leave and declare itself to be the
national legislature of Bolivia instead. More to the point, any change in the
delegation regime would itself be subject to a presidential veto, so each
Congress is to some degree locked into the delegation arrangements inherited
from previous Congresses.
If IO membership is voluntary, why would countries delegate in the first
place? We argue that international organizations are held together by network
externalities, such as free trade, safety via nuclear nonproliferation, and so on.
Specifically, a defining feature of international organizations is that the more
countries that belong to them, the more benefits accrue to all members. In this
sense, IOs display increasing returns to scale, similar to many social or Internetbased resources. Conversely, the departure of key countries can do significant
harm to an international organization, sometimes triggering a wave of
defections.8
This article provides a theory of delegation to IOs that incorporates free exit
and network externalities into the standard delegation-modeling framework.
What issues should such a theory to be able to address?
1. It should predict an IO’s membership, including states’ decisions to
enter and exit.
2. It should predict the policy goals pursued by the IO; moreover, these
policy goals should themselves affect membership. Formal models of
IOs to date take either the policy choices or the member states as
given, but the UNESCO example above makes clear that changes in
policy can lead to changes in membership as well.

7. Whether exit is truly costless is open to debate; some international organizations place limits on
the rights of their members to exit, although the degree to which these actually bind member states is
unclear. For a full discussion, see generally Lawrence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579
(2005). In any case, this article’s argument relates international conditions to an IO’s membership,
whether through previous entry and exit, or whether a country never joins the IO at all, as the United
States did with the League of Nations.
8. In fact, the United States’ departure from UNESCO was followed not only by that of the
United Kingdom, but also by that of Singapore in 1986. UNESCO EXECUTIVE BOARD, REPORT BY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
ON
BUDGET
ADJUSTMENTS
6
(1997),
available
at
THE
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001087/108711E.pdf.
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3. It should allow for differences among states; in particular, some states
might be in a position to confer more benefits on their fellow member
states than others, such as large countries offering access to their
markets by lowering trade barriers. These differences are, in turn, the
source of differential power among member countries within the IO.
4. Consistent with the themes of this symposium, it should logically define
and incorporate the notions of delegation and sovereignty costs. Even
in the face of these costs, it should give countries an incentive to join
and stay in the IO.
5. Finally, it should allow for the possibility of partial accession to treaties
and predict under which circumstances devices such as reservations will
be allowed.
The model we present below is able to address all these issues, so it is a useful
prototype to study delegation relationships within IOs. In contrast to the
standard setting, where the degree of discretion delegated is linked to the
harmony of interests among the actors, in the international setting an IO’s
authority will be circumscribed by the “biggest weakest link;” that is, the least
internationally oriented country whose exit would cause the IO to collapse.
The next Part reviews the relevant modeling literature on delegation in IOs.
Then, in the third Part, we provide an overview of our approach and relate it to
the terms of debate in the sovereignty literature. The Part that follows provides
a formal specification of the model. The fifth Part solves for the equilibria of the
model in general, while the sixth provides a detailed examination of a threecountry case with an integrationist IO. The last Part concludes with implications
for the long run sustainability and optimal structure of international
organizations.
II
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many excellent studies of international organizations that
emphasize the delegation relationships inherent in their establishment and
operation. Daniel Nelson and Michael Tierney, for instance, have reviewed
agency theory and applied it to World Bank environmental reform projects.9
Other essays explore the ways in which countries circumscribe delegation
relationships with IOs so as to limit agency losses.10
There are, however, few formal models of delegation to IOs; rather, gametheoretic treatments of IOs tend to explore IOs’ relation to the collective
dilemmas that bring them into existence. The modeling tradition begun by
Robert Keohane, for example, views international organizations as solutions to
9. See generally Daniel Nelson & Michael Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations:
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003).
10. See, e.g., DARREN HAWKINS ET AL., DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (2006).
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coordination problems that countries cannot solve efficiently through a series of
bilateral agreements.11 A second line of reasoning, due originally to George
Tsebelis, examines the impact of domestic bargaining on the nested or “twolevel” games of international relations.12 And recently, a third line of inquiry has
emphasized the informational advantages conferred by membership in
international organizations.13
But given their description of international cooperation as simply a solution
to a prisoners’ dilemma, these models cannot easily incorporate concepts such
as sovereignty costs, partial association or, indeed, power in international
organizations. Nor do they simultaneously address the questions of which
policies IOs adopt and which countries choose to belong to IOs, let alone the
more complicated issues of reservations and reciprocity. This article contributes
to the literature precisely along these lines of inquiry.
The model has as its basis the classic models of delegation relationships in
political science.14 It is closely associated with the articles by Mathew
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast and by us,15 in which discretion
was essentially defined as “whatever the agency can get away with,” rather than
being explicitly circumscribed by the political actors delegating to the agency.
But rather than require all other political players to act in concert to overturn
an agency’s decision—such as when the House, Senate, and President must each
approve a new law to counteract agency rulemaking—the setting for this model
allows any single member country to unilaterally change outcomes by simply
removing itself from the IO.
III
MODEL PREVIEW
The theoretical framework for analyzing delegation in political science is a
variant on the spatial model of political institutions, which assumes that actors
have most-preferred policies—or ideal points—in some policy space, and they
want to bring policy outcomes as close as possible to their ideal point. It is
political institutions that determine who gets enfranchised into the
11. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).

AFTER HEMOGENY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN

12. See generally, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN
COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1991).
13. See, e.g., Leslie Johns, A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of
International Bureaucrats, 61 INT’L ORG. 245 (2007); Andrew Kydd, Which Side Are You On? Bias,
Credibility, and Mediation, 47(4) AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 597 (2003); Helen Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff,
Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups 8(2) ECON. &
POL. 145–89 (1996).
14. See, e.g., infra notes 15–16.
15. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS]; David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38(3) AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994)
[hereinafter Epstein & O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures]; M.D. McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
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policymaking process, under what conditions, and thus who wins and who loses
at the end of the day.
This setup is illustrated in two dimensions in Figure 1. The small dots
represent the ideal points of member states in some international organization.
The large dot indicates the status quo policy ex ante. The dotted circle indicates
those outcomes that can be implemented under a rule limiting the
organization’s discretion to d.
Figure 1 : The basic game of international delegation.

The policymaking institutions of the organization determine which way
policy will move in response to various external events. If, for instance, all
countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO) play by the rules, then
the policy outcome is that each country in the agreement receives most-favorednation status. If one country imposes an import barrier in contravention of the
WTO statutes, then by the organization’s rules the offending state should be
punished. For the moment it does not matter whether the change in policy
effected by the organization’s rules is implemented by a single individual, a
body, or a completely mechanistic procedure of automatic adjustment.
Within this context, delegation is defined simply as conferring to the IO
16
Of
some degree of authority to move policy away from the status quo.
particular interest is the distance from the status quo to which policy can be
changed—that is, the degree of discretion given to the international
organization. We can envision limits on discretion as circumscribing the range
of possible policies that the IO can enact—for instance, a requirement that the
policy outcome may not differ from the status quo by more than some distance
d, as indicated in the figure. Then unbounded delegation is associated with

16. In the domestic-politics setting, an agency can usually move policy unilaterally. In the
international setting with free exit, the IO must induce each member state to change its policies, if
necessary, to be brought into line with its dictates.
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infinitely large values of d; as d shrinks towards zero, less and less power is
delegated. When d = 0, delegation ends.
This setup has the advantage of making certain terms in the delegation
debate susceptible to precise definition. Most importantly, sovereignty costs can
be defined as the distance between the policy that a country would implement if
it were not a member of the international organization and of the policy that it
enacts once it has joined. In the figure, this would be the distance between the
policy adopted by the international organization and each country’s ideal point.
Therefore, sovereignty costs are no more or less than changes in policy
outcomes.
The model can also incorporate the fact that some countries join an
organization fully, while others do so only partially. In the model, this would
occur when a country is allowed to move its policy only part of the distance
away from its ideal point and towards the policy mandated by the international
organization. For instance, one possibility in the two-dimensional space drawn
here is that a country would have to adopt the organization’s policy in the xdimension, but not the y-dimension. Finally, this framework can clarify some
questions in the IO literature, such as whether countries with veto power
actually delegate.
Figure 2, for example, assumes that five member states are veto players (V).
Figure 2: The delegation game with veto players.

Consider status quo points that lie within the area enclosed by the dotted
lines joining the veto players’ ideal points. Moving policy in any direction will
make at least one veto player worse off, and thus in a single-shot game there
would be no way to change a status quo like SQ. But a status quo outside of this
region, such as SQ’, could be changed, as long as it is moved closer to the veto
players’ desired policies. The larger the area inside the dotted lines—that is, the
more heterogeneous the preferences of the veto players—the fewer the
circumstances in which the organization can change policy away from the status
quo, and hence the less discretion the organization will have. This finding that
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organizations have more discretion when the preferences of their member states
are more homogeneous could explain, for instance, why many European Union
nations resisted expansion, despite the network benefits to be gained by adding
more countries.
Since there are circumstances in which the IO can move policy, being a veto
player does not nullify delegation. On the other hand, since all changes in policy
must make each veto player at least indifferent between the proposed policy
and the status quo, veto players will not pay sovereignty costs by joining the
IO.17
IV
MODEL
A variant on the traditional delegation model captures the dual features of
free exit and network externalities in international organizations. Although this
variant borrows the intuition from the two-dimensional model discussed in the
previous Part, here a uni-dimensional policy space, X = [0,1], is investigated,
where the value of x corresponds to the amount of the public good or
cooperative behavior provided. If X is the space of trade policy, for instance,
then x = 0 would be an autarky with prohibitive tariffs, while x = 1 would be
completely free trade. In nuclear proliferation, x = 0 might indicate no limits at
all on nuclear development or testing, while x = 1 could mean an absolute
prohibition on all such actions.
There is a set
of countries, each of which has domestic
costs and benefits regarding the policy chosen. In particular, we assume that,
acting in isolation from other countries, benefits per unit of x are constant,
while the costs are increasing, so that for Country i,

is a parameter measuring the political importance of
Here,
regulatory costs for Country . This formulation emphasizes the fact that, to
varying degrees, countries will often provide some amount of international
public goods on their own; even absent trade agreements, for example, few
countries are run as complete autarkies.
The relative costs of acceding to international demands rise at an increasing
rate, relative to the benefits. So the political costs of free trade get higher the
more domestic markets are opened, and eliminating the last ten percent of

17. Furthermore, member states of IOs often engage in repeated interactions, not just single-shot
games. In this context, a state with veto power might be convinced to allow a policy change that it does
not agree with in return for policy concessions further down the road. That is, individual decisions may
impose sovereignty costs even on a veto player if the long-run tradeoffs are important enough.
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pollutants that cause acid rain is more expensive than eliminating the first ten
percent. Solving for first-order conditions shows that if only Country i existed, it
, where is Country ’s “standwould maximize utility by setting policy
alone” ideal point.
In addition to these domestic costs and benefits, each country can reap
associational benefits by joining other countries in an international
organization. Network externalities are captured by the assumption that each
member state confers a benefit
on all other members of an IO. In trade
policy, for example, might be proportional to the size of the tradable sector of
a country’s economy. In a mutual defense treaty, it could represent a country’s
join the organization as
military capacity. If a subset of countries
members, then potential associational benefits for each country are
. When
, total benefits are denoted as .
In the game, the IO moves first, naming a policy level x. All countries then
simultaneously and noncooperatively decide whether to become a member of
the IO. Member countries agree to set policy at , while nonmembers can set
policy wherever they like. Associational benefits are then scaled by the level of
for all member countries. The idea here is
policy, so that they are equal to
that, for example, the benefits of free trade grow as the WTO requires higher
and higher levels of tariff concessions. So if every country in the world joined
the WTO, for instance, but x = 0, then no free-trade benefits would accrue in
any case. Thus countries in the organization receive total utility:

from remaining in the organization. This yields an adjusted ideal point
if all countries become members. Each country’s
“associational” ideal point
is larger—more internationally oriented,
that is—than their stand-alone ideal point.18
Since membership in international organizations is voluntary, countries will
remain in an organization only as long as they receive at least as much utility as
they would receive implementing their stand-alone ideal point; that is, as long
as

18. This is the parallel in our model to Robert Keohane’s assumption that all countries would
agree that they would be made better off if they could all be forced to contribute more to the public
good than they each would contribute individually. See ROBERT KEOHANE, supra note 11, at 67–78.
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Such a country is willing to pay sovereignty costs equal to
, which is
the distance from the policy imposed by the organization to the country’s own
ideal point. An organization’s membership is globally stable when this condition
holds for all
.
V
DELEGATION AND FEASIBLE COALITIONS
Assume that the IO wishes to attract member states
. This Part
derives conditions under which such a coalition can form, and if so, which
policies the IO can enact. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that absent
any benefits from international cooperation, each country will set policy at its
ideal point . Furthermore, for any value of , there is an equilibrium where no
state joins the IO, since an organization with no members cannot induce any
one state to alter its policy away from its ideal point. Similarly, changing policy
so that a particular country decides to drop out might trigger a cascade of
defections, since the aggregate benefits of remaining in the organization have
been reduced. The analysis will thus focus on the equilibrium with the largest
possible sustainable membership in the IO.
from joining the organization, the
The greater the aggregate benefits
farther from its ideal point a given country is willing to allow policy to wander.
, and
So for a given policy x, potential member countries
associated level of benefits
, Country is willing to join the organization as
long as
, Country i’s “delegation range.” Then
all countries in
will agree to stay in the IO when these delegation ranges
overlap; that is, when

Order the countries in
so that
, so that Country 1 is the
, and
,
low-demander and Country m is the high-demander. If
for all
. In other words, to
then it is easy to see that
check if a given delegation regime is stable for all countries in , one need only
check that Countries and —those with extreme ideal points—prefer to stay
in the organization rather than revert to their stand-alone ideal policies.
will be
Formally, for a given policy level x, the overlap region
, in which case it will be equal to
nonempty when
. The key to the equilibrium is that the policy
x generating this interval must also be inside it: we must find some x for which
. Otherwise, the degree of internationalization necessary to generate
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sufficient network externalities will ask too much of the low-demanding
country.19
When will the delegation ranges intersect in the appropriate way? The
and
first touch at
. The needed for this is
ranges

This is to the left of the intersection when:

(Equation 5.1)
denotes the minimum level of benefits
where
coalition with member states .

that can support a

Thus coalition

can be sustained whenever
. Three
propositions immediately follow: First, cooperation is easier when its benefits
rise; no surprise here. Second, all else being equal, cooperation is easier when
is small. And
the countries have homogeneous preferences, so that
is large, so that countries’ stand-alone
third, cooperation is easier when
ideal points are more internationally oriented.
The lowest policy level which sustains cooperation occurs when

19. For example, the proposed United States–South Korea free-trade agreement is currently
foundering over the issue of imported beef. The South Korean government would, in principle, like
greater integration, but the political costs sustained by exposing the beef industry to competition would
overwhelm any compensating benefits, and without such a provision the agreement would be too weak
to attract U.S. participation. For the U.S. position on the issue, see Embassy of the United States, U.S.
Free-Trade Pact with South Korea Would Enhance Partnership (June 13, 2007),
http://seoul.usembassy.gov/413_061407a.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008).
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Similarly, the highest policy level which sustains cooperation occurs when

This, in turn, is less than 1 when
(Equation 5.2)
denotes the level of above which all member states in coalition
where
will remain in the IO, even with
.
We thus have three possibilities for the equilibrium:
1.
2.

: Coalition
cannot form.
: Coalition
can be sustained for any
.

3.

: Coalition

can be sustained for any

.

; the
In the first case, there is no way to sustain the proposed coalition
international organization cannot please all countries simultaneously. In
particular, policies that would induce Country 1 to join the IO have too little
spillover benefits to attract Country m, while policies that would keep Country
m satisfied are too demanding for Country 1. In the third case, the organization
) and
has a relatively free hand; it can set policy as high as it likes (up to
still retain all states in the coalition, because the benefits from association are
high enough to induce even the low-demanders to stay in the organization.
In the second case, cooperation is possible, but only for a limited range of
values for . Assuming that the IO implements the highest degree of integration
, which is always greater than the midpoint
possible, it will set
between the ideal points
and
. So on the one hand, outcomes in such
organizations will be biased towards high-demanders; they pay fewer
sovereignty costs than do the low-demanders. On the other hand,
, so it is the low-demanders who have power within an
while
organization; outcomes change in response to changes in their preferences, not
those of the high-demanders. The limits of an IO’s discretion are therefore
determined by its “biggest weakest link,” or the lowest-demand country that the
IO wishes to include in the organization.
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VI
EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INTEGRATIONIST ORGANIZATION
Part V detailed the conditions under which an equilibrium including all
could exist, and if existing, the ranges of feasible
states in coalition
policies that the IO could implement. It also detailed the basic tradeoff inherent
in determining an IO’s membership: expanding the list of participating
countries versus higher levels of integration. The next step is to derive
predictions as to which of the feasible coalitions will actually constitute the IO,
and to do this one must first specify the IO’s preferences over outcomes, for
both the policy chosen and the extent of its membership.
Analogous to the traditional delegation literature, one could assume that
the IO has an ideal point within the policy space and tries to bring outcomes as
close to that point as possible. That is, the IO could be modeled as if it were a
state within the system, and this might be a reasonable approach for
organizations that are dominated by a single country (as, arguably, the World
Bank is dominated by the United States). Similarly, if policies are to be voted
on, the IO might adopt the ideal point of its median member, or the pivotal
member state in a supermajority or qualified majority voting system.
Alternatively, one might assume that organizations have position-taking
preferences—much as agencies are sometimes modeled as wanting to maximize
their budgets—in which case they might take extreme stances on issues
important to those who run the IO, regardless of the impact this might have on
the organization’s reputation or membership. (This is one interpretation of
UNESCO’s actions as detailed in Part I.) Another possibility is that the IO
cares only about maximizing membership, regardless of the policy
consequences. The United Nations, for instance, feels that it can only operate
legitimately if it can boast global membership, even though this means that it
finds itself hamstrung in many cases, unable to act without triggering a veto by
key member states.
Again, though, the translation of delegation models to an international
setting provides extra possibilities. In particular, we assume that the IO has
what we term “integrationist preferences,” meaning that it wants to maximize
, the weighted sum of the policy positions for states in the IO. For instance,
the WTO would be modeled as wanting to maximize the amount of free trade in
the world trading system. Such a formulation means that the IO will take into
will make trade freer for those
account the fact that raising standards
countries that continue to participate in the system, but it might reduce free
trade overall by inducing some states to exit. Thus, integrationist organizations
will under some circumstances take into account the preferences of those
countries less oriented towards integrationist policies, especially if those
countries weigh heavily in terms of the potential benefits they offer (high values
of ), or if their leaving the system could induce a cascade of defections by
other countries.
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We examine a version of this game with three countries, having ideal points
. To simplify the analysis, we assume the countries are
. Since a nontrivial IO
identical except for their ideal points, so
has more than one member, there are three possible equilibrium configurations:
no countries join the IO (it cannot form a coalition around any policy);
Countries 2 and 3 join the IO; or all three countries join.
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 above provide the conditions under which either the
coalition of Countries 2 and 3 or the grand coalition (GC) of all countries can
be maintained:

, then no IO can form, as network externalities
If
are too small to entice countries away from their stand-alone ideal points. It
remains to specify the conditions under which the IO will choose to set policy to
attract only countries 2 and 3, and when it will attract all three to a grand
coalition. The latter provides the IO with greater utility when

Equilibrium outcomes when
and
are shown in Figure 3 for
different values of network benefits b and Country 1’s ideal point . For any
and
give the minimum values of needed to
given level of ,
sustain cooperation. For points where some cooperation is possible, the
line separates those cases where an integrationist IO prefers the grand coalition
to attracting only Countries 2 and 3.

03__EPSTEIN_OHALLORAN.DOC

90

6/9/2008 8:02:21 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 71:77

Figure 3: Three-country equilibrium when IO has integrationist preferences.
The Figure assumes that
and
.

As indicated, in equilibrium, low values of
are associated with no
). High values of both
and have the grand
organization at all (
), and intermediate values have a coalition of Countries
coalition (
2 and 3 (
). Since all points in the area showing coalitions of
Countries 2 and 3 lie below
, they all involve levels of cooperation with
. For points above
but to the left of
, is again less than 1,
while to the right of
, maximum cooperation with a grand coalition is
possible.
What does this diagram say about the membership and goals of IOs? First,
they are most effective when preferences are homogeneous, so that Country 1 is
less of an outlier, and when the potential benefits of cooperation are high. In
those areas where the grand coalition forms, though, Country 1 pays fewer
sovereignty costs and has more power within the IO when it is more of an
outlier, because the IO will prefer to accommodate Country 1’s demands and
will set policy in a manner that is sensitive to changes in Country 1’s ideal point.
But unless the benefits from cooperation are high enough, there will come a
point at which Country 1 is too much of an outlier and the organization will
allow it to exit (or not give it sufficient incentives to join in the first place), thus
eliminating Country 1’s sovereignty costs altogether but, of course, also
eliminating any power or leverage that Country 1 had with the organization.
This type of framework facilitates certain thought experiments with respect
to specific incidents in the development of IOs. For instance, at first blush the
interpretation of the UNESCO case cited in Part I is that the IO initially had
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extreme position-taking preferences, so that it cared more about making a
statement than retaining the support of certain major countries. If this view is
correct, then one would look for a leadership change within UNESCO, possibly
chastened by the exits of several countries, which would lead to new policies
sufficiently reducing the sovereignty costs so that the United States and United
Kingdom would return to the fold.
But there are other possibilities as well. Say the ideal points of the United
States and United Kingdom were to become more extreme relative to the other
countries already in UNESCO—either through their becoming more
conservative or through other member countries becoming more internationally
oriented—so that an integrationist organization preferred to move away from
the grand coalition. Then one would look to changes in the preferences of
member countries to explain the reintegration of the defectors. Or say the
benefits from cooperation were to fall so that it was no longer worthwhile to
keep the United States and the United Kingdom within the IO. In that case,
one would look to changes in technology or other elements of the international
policy environment to explain reentry. Or perhaps it would be some
combination of the above. None of these perspectives is necessarily the correct
one; the point is that having a modeling framework suggests checking different
possibilities and empirical correlates than would have occurred to researchers
beforehand.
VII
CONCLUSION
One is tempted to say that delegating sovereignty is a bit of an oxymoron.
Just like the U.S. Senator from Louisiana who insisted that his vote could not
be bought, but it could be rented, in a world with free exit, sovereignty cannot
truly be delegated, but it can be loaned. Nations participate in international
organizations because it is in their interest to do so, and they can withdraw
when this is no longer the case. This does not mean that no alternative
arrangement might make the country better off, or that their preferred policies
are always enacted. Barring coercion or extreme exit costs, though,
participation in international organizations is voluntary and therefore should be
seen as a natural extension of member states’ rights and an exercise of their
sovereignty, rather than as a violation.
Our intent in this article is to offer an extension of formal models of
delegation that takes free exit and network externalities into account, and in
which sovereignty costs, IO membership, and international policy can be
addressed in a natural manner. The model shows that equilibrium conditions
are straightforward to characterize and that, in general, low-demand outlier
countries pay higher sovereignty costs but wield more power in international
organizations than do their more internationally-oriented counterparts.
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This model can be extended in a number of interesting ways. First, partial
adoption of treaties can be integrated into the analysis by allowing member
countries to adopt any policy
, where
is a parameter indicating
the proportion of the IO’s mandates adopted by Country . Such a country
toward the common
would then contribute network externalities equal to
benefits in return.
good and, if other countries reciprocate, receive only
for each country and see when an
One could then solve for the optimal
integrationist IO would allow such reservations as the necessary price for
retaining the membership of certain key countries. We leave these and other
extensions to future work.

